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Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study* 
I. Introduction 
Public distrust of middlemen frequently occurs in market systems. Boycotts, regulations, and 
investigations of middlemen are not uncommon [3; 7]. This position of disfavor is somewhat 
paradoxical since application of economic theory suggests that competition among mid- 
dlemen can be relied upon to protect consumers and producers. According to received doc- 
trine any differences in purchase and resale prices would reflect he costs involved in market 
making. Nevertheless public suspicion remains. 
While the reason for public suspicion is never precisely stated, it seems to be based upon 
the obvious special position that middlemen occupy. By holding purchase prices low and re- 
sale prices high, by simply restricting carry-forward, middlemen will profit. This possibility 
is certainly obvious to everyone and in particular it is obvious to the middlemen themselves. 
Consequently, unlike many other markets the potential gain from cooperation and the joint 
cooperative strategy is clear to all. Because of this special environment markets with mid- 
dlemen may have an inherent tendency to behave differently when compared to other mar- 
kets. 
Aside from this "natural coalitional situation" for some participants, markets with mid- 
dlemen are also characterized by a type of informational asymmetry. Primary producers are 
generally unaware of the final market demand and prices for their product. They see this de- 
mand only as filtered through the middlemen. Likewise, ultimate consumers receive the of- 
fers of producers attempting to sell their produce only as filtered through the middlemen. 
Thus with the establishment of middlemen a single market containing primary producers 
and ultimate consumers is partitioned into two markets: primary producers and middlemen 
plus final consumers and middlemen. The competitive theory applied without sensitivity to 
the informational differences predicts that the two markets will behave as the one. 
Because of the informational asymmetry the study of markets with middlemen provides 
a particularly good opportunity to further isolate conditions under which the competitive 
model tends to work. It is now well established by many replications that in stationary mar- 
kets organized under auction rules contracts prices tend to converge to or deviate only 
slightly from the theoretical equilibrium. The phenomenon occurs even though participants 
know only their own individual supply or demand schedule. Miller, Plott, and Smith [2] 
have suggested that necessary and sufficient conditions for a classical competitive stationary 
equilibrium include the following: (1) each economic agent knows only his own valuation 
conditions, (2) information on all price bids, price offers, and price contracts is available at 
approximately zero cost to all agents, and (3) the process is repetitively stationary, i.e., each 
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agent is a buyer or a seller of units in each of several trading periods with individual valu- 
ations unchanging from period to period. This permits learning by trial and error from one 
trading period to the next. 
This experiment is based on the idea that a stationary market which yields a competitive 
equilibrium with buyers and sellers interacting directly will also yield a competitive quilib- 
rium when middlemen are placed between the ultimate buyers and primary sellers. Since 
only the middlemen are familiar with information on prices in both markets, and since the 
only market information exchanged between the two markets is that conveyed by the actions 
of the middlemen, condition (2) is violated. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that the average 
contract price in the middlemen/primary sellers and middlemen/ultimate buyers markets 
will deviate only slightly, if at all, in the final trading period. In addition, the competitive 
price/quantity equilibrium will be reached in the final trading period. 
The trading institution used in the markets we study here differs slightly from the or- 
ganization used in previous studies. In all other double oral auctions only one outstanding 
bid or offer existed at a time. Each bid or offer canceled any previous bid or offer.' In the 
markets tudied here all bids and offers remained active until changed, retracted by the indi- 
vidual making them, or accepted. Thus our markets are similar to markets in which limit or- 
ders can be placed in an open book. 
A third potentially important variable also exists. In one experimental market (market 
X), four middlemen existed and for a second experimental market (market Y), three mid- 
dlemen existed. This is a potentially important departure from the Miller, Plott, Smith [2] 
study in which only two traders existed. Intuitively it seems as though three or four traders 
may accidentally carry forward "too much" or "too little"; with many traders no one has 
good information about the total planned carry-forward of the group. 
II. Subjects and Experimental Design 
The subjects were undergraduate male and female students at the California Institute of 
Technology. They were recruited by asking for volunteers in the lounges of the student 
houses. Subjects were divided into four groups: buyers, sellers, traders X, and traders Y, and 
placed in four separate rooms. In these experiments the middlemen were termed "traders." 
The individual marginal supply and demand valuations were assigned randomly to the sell- 
ers and buyers respectively who were spatially seated so that this individual information was 
private. In each separate room copies of the instructions, imilar to those used in Miller, 
Plott, Smith [2], were distributed and read aloud by one of the experimenters, after which 
questions were answered. So not only were parameters known only individually, participants 
did not know the instructions given to any other group. 
In this experiment there were two separate markets, an X market and a Y market. In the 
X market, traders X purchased units of commodity X from the sellers during the buying sea- 
son for sale to the buyers during the selling season. In the Y market, traders Y purchased 
units of commodity Y from the sellers during the buying season for sale to the buyers during 
the selling season. The markets were executed in an alternating sequence with only one com- 
modity being traded each period. Thus sellers first sold X to traders X in room 1 and then, 
while traders X were reselling X to buyers in room 2, the sellers in room I were selling Y to 
traders Y. Traders could hold units for only one season with zero storage cost, and short sales 
1. Under some rules a bid (offer) must be higher (lower) than the outstanding bid (offer) on the floor in order 
to replace it on the floor. 
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were not permited. This corresponds to a crop commodity that is perishable by the end of 
season. At no time was any information exchanged directly between the sellers and buyers or 
between traders X and traders Y. As traders moved between rooms, they were accompanied 
at all times by some member of the experimental team. 
The demand and supply schedules shown in Figures 1 and were constructed in accord- 
ance with the theory of induced valuation [6]. For example, from Figure 1, subject 5 (a seller 
had marginal costs of $1.18 for his first unit, $1.39 for a second unit, and $1.60, $1.98, $2.34, 
and $2.42 for this third through sixth unit respectively in the X market. Similarly, in the Y 
market his marginal costs were $2.76, $3.10, $3.24, and $3.67. Each seller received cash pay- 
ments equal to $0.10 plus the difference between the sales price and the marginal cost for 
each sold. Each buyer received cash payments equal to $0.10 plus the difference between the 
marginal valuation and purchase price for each unit bought. Each trader received $0.10 plus 
the difference between the selling price and buying price for each unit traded. The purpose 
of the 10 cent "commission" was to overcome subjective transaction cost and thereby to in- 
duce minimally the exchange of marginal units by a buyer, seller, or trader [4]. Traders each 
received $1 per period in starting capital to cover potential losses. 
Market demand in both markets was obtained from the demands of five buyers, while 
market supply was derived from the supplies of five sellers. Four subjects served as traders in 
the X market where the competitive price-quantity equilibria were $1.67 and fourteen units. 
Similarly, the Y market had three traders and the competitive price-quantity equilibria were 
$3.10 and nine units. No trader had knowledge of the valuations of any buyer or seller, nor 
were traders explicitly informed of each other's inventory. 
III. Experimental Results 
Figures 3 and 4 show the tendency of contract prices in successive trading periods to con- 
verge to values near the competitive quilibrium price. Early periods show low prices due to 
middleman caution. At the start of the experiment when middlemen face primary sellers for 
the first ime they have no idea of what demand will be in the middlemen/ultimate buyer 
market. This caution is understandable. However, after experience has been gained by the 
middleman, the markets converge to near the competitive quilibrium. In the X market (Fig- 
ure 3), the buying and selling prices in the final trading period are $1.6707 and $1.6857 re- 
spectively with fourteen units traded. The equilibrium price and quantity is $1.67 and four- 
teen units. In the Y market (Figure 4), the buying and selling prices in the final trading 
period are $3.1625 and $3.0863 with eight units traded. The equilibrium price and quantity 
are $3.10 and nine units. 
Table I shows that middlemen profits tended to decrease in successive trading periods. 
In fact, the middlemen in the Y market actually had negative profits in the last two trading 
periods. 
An alternative measure of market performance is obtained by computing the index of 
efficiency [4, 139-42]. Inefficiencies occur when extramarginal units (units with marginal 
supply valuations above and units with marginal demand valuations below the equilibrium 
price) are traded and when intramarginal units (with marginal supply valuations below, and 
marginal demand valuations above the equilibrium) fail to be traded. No inefficiency occurs 
if and only if subjects receive the maximum total payments (consumer plus producer sur- 
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Figure 3. X-Market Contract Prices in Sequence of Occurrence 
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Figure 4. Y-Market Contract Prices in Sequence of Occurrence 
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Table I. Middleman Profits Excluding Commissions and Capital Payments 
Period 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 
Traders X ($) 0.95 0.64 2.30 2.20 1.18 1.07 0.21 
Period 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
Traders Y ($) 0.00 0.14 4.10 2.38 0.52 -3.13 -0.51 
plus). Actual payments as a percentage of the maximum available under perfect competitive 
price equilibrium ($12.65 per period in the X market, and $8.60 per period in the Y market) 
provide an index of efficiency shown in Table II. 
The efficiency in the later periods is comparable to that obtained in similar experiments 
without middlemen [5] with one exception. In period 6 of the Y market, one middleman mis- 
takenly did not sell a unit purchased due to inaccurate bookkeeping. If this unit is neglected, 
the efficiency would be 98.5 percent for that period. 
IV. Conclusions 
Competitive forces among middlemen in the two markets we studied effectively prevented 
profiteering at the expense of producers and consumers. The behavior of these markets is 
well within the range of experience with experimefital markets in general and markets with 
speculators in particular [2; 1] and it is approximated by the competitive model. 
The predictions of the loose theories about the pervasive influence of middlemen upon 
which these experiments were based have failed to materialize. Perhaps within other institu- 
tional arrangements the "profiteering" advantages of middlemen can be easily seen, but cur- 
rently it is not obvious that such arrangements exist. Those who feel that the special position 
of the middleman as an agent which separates ultimate consumers from primary producers 
necessarily leads to a type of monopoly rents are wrong in the sense that if such effects exist 
they are sufficiently small so that they will be detected only after many observations. The ad- 
Table II. Index of Efficiency 
Period 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 
X Market (%) 87.4 81.4 91.3 97.4 97.6 97.6 100.0 
Period 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 
Y Market (%) 00.0 60.9 96.5 100.0 100.0 61.6 93.4 
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dition of one set of middlemen between consumers and producers does not automatically 
lead to "substantial" market inefficiencies. In fact, we could detect none at all. In order for 
further experiments to be useful, those suspicious of middlemen should refine the theory in a 
way which would help focus the experimental design on the study of special cases where the 
potential influences are magnified and easily detectable if they should exist. 
The convergence to near the competitive equilibrium leads to another conclusion. 
Miller, Plott, Smith [2] conjecture that a necessary condition for classical competitive sta- 
tionary equilibrium is that information market prices must be available at approximately 
zero cost to all agents. In our experiments only the traders were fully informed. Thus, if our 
experimental markets are viewed as one market with middlemen carrying commodities be- 
tween buyers and sellers rather than two markets, the conjecture is incorrect. Markets can 
converge to near the competitive equilibrium if organized "properly" even if some people 
are uninformed about various types of transaction prices. 
The results extend the knowledge about the behavior of experimental markets in two 
additional directions. First, increasing the number of traders in a speculative market from 
two to three or four does not automatically produce instabilities. Previous research only uti- 
lized two speculators where the potential for "uncoordinated" carry-forward seemed less. Sec- 
ondly, we detected no influence due to the particular trading rules. If the "open book" with 
limit orders behaves differently from the New York Stock Exchange rules, it may take many 
experimental sessions to reveal the differences. In these two experiments we found no differ- 
ences which could be documented. Of course, without additional experiments we cannot 
conclude that these institutions (or the middlemen for that matter) have no independent ef- 
fects. Yet, the results are so close to what has been observed for many experiments that the 
subject does not seem to be worth pursuing with further experiments until some theory sug- 
gests something specific for which we should look. 
Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, California 
Jonathan T. Uhl 
Princeton University 
Princeton, New Jersey 
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